00984nas a2200169   4500008004100000245005500041210005500096260000900151300001400160490000700174520047200181653001200653653001700665100001800682700002000700856009400720       2003                        eng d00aExecutive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany0 aExecutive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany  c2003  a1391-14100 v273 aWith the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aGoldberg, Larry  u/biblio/executive-compensation-and-agency-costs-germany-2