01313nas a2200181   4500008004100000245005400041210005400095260000900149490000600158520076400164653001200928653001700940100001800957700001700975700003000992710001801022856009101040       2014                        eng d00aExecutive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy0 aExecutive Compensation and Agency Issues in Italy  c20140 v53 aFrom a theoretical perspective, we posit that that dividend policies may be relevant in resolving agency issues even in a governance environment dominated by family controlled firms. Earlier research has found that in more market based systems such as the US and Canada, dividends are in fact instrumental in solving agency issues. Prior empirical research has also found that dividends have a role in mitigating agency conflicts in a bank-dominated corporate environments like that in Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). This paper extends the findings of earlier research by empirically investigating whether dividends retain their importance as the mechanism for resolving residual agency issues in a family controlled governance environment like Italy10aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aRondi, Laura1 aBhattacharyya, Nalanaksha1 aEmptyAuthNode  u/biblio/executive-compensation-and-agency-issues-italy00583nas a2200157   4500008004100000245008900041210006900130260000900199300001000208490000700218653001200225653001700237100001800254700003000272856012300302       2011                        eng d00aDividends, Executive Compensation, and Agency Costs: Empirical Evidence From Germany0 aDividends Executive Compensation and Agency Costs Empirical Evid  c2011  a11-200 v1110aFinance10aOSU-Cascades1 aElston, Julie1 aBhattacharyya, Nalanaksha  u/biblio/dividends-executive-compensation-and-agency-costs-empirical-evidence-germany-0