00648nas a2200169   4500008004100000245012000041210006900161260000900230300001400239490000700253653001700260653001700277100001800294700001600312700001800328856013200346       2022                        eng d00aRevenue sharing bids of a loss-averse supplier for a new product development contract: A multi-method investigation0 aRevenue sharing bids of a lossaverse supplier for a new product   c2022  a1853-18770 v4210aOSU-Cascades10aSupply Chain1 aRibbink, Dina1 aPun, Hubert1 aYan, Tingting  u/biblio/revenue-sharing-bids-loss-averse-supplier-new-product-development-contract-multi-method02049nas a2200181   4500008004100000245012100041210006900162260000900231300001000240490000700250520145200257653001701709653001701726100001801743700001801761700001601779856007201795       2018                        eng d00aIncentivizing Supplier Participation in Buyer Innovation: Experimental Evidence of Non-Optimal Contractual Behaviors0 aIncentivizing Supplier Participation in Buyer Innovation Experim  c2018  a36-530 v573 aOriginal equipment manufacturers increasingly involve suppliers in new product development (NPD) projects. How companies design a contract to motivate supplier participation is an important but under-examined empirical question. Analytical studies have started to examine the optimal contract that aligns buyer-supplier incentives in joint NPD projects, but empirical evidence is scarce about the actual contracts offered by buying companies. Bridging the analytical and empirical literature, this paper compares optimal contracting derived from a parsimonious analytical model with actual behaviors observed in an experiment. In particular, we focus on how project uncertainty, buying company effort share, and buyer risk aversion influence three contractual decisions: total investment level, revenue share and fixed fee. Our results indicate significant differences between the optimal and actual behaviors. We identify various types of non-optimal contractual behaviors, which we explain from a risk aversion as well as a bounded rationality perspective. Overall, our findings contribute to the literature by showing that (1) the actual contractual behaviors could differ significantly from the optimal ones, (2) the actual contract design is sensitive to changes in project uncertainty and buying company effort share, and (3) the significant roles of risk aversion and bounded rationality in explaining the non-optimal contractual behaviors.10aOSU-Cascades10aSupply Chain1 aYan, Tingting1 aRibbink, Dina1 aPun, Hubert  uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027269631730058X00478nas a2200145   4500008004100000245005200041210005100093260001800144653001700162653001700179100001800196700001600214700001800230856008400248       2017                        eng d00aWinning the Bid: Competition in NPD Contracting0 aWinning the Bid Competition in NPD Contracting  aSeattlec201710aOSU-Cascades10aSupply Chain1 aRibbink, Dina1 aPun, Hubert1 aYan, Tingting  u/biblio/winning-bid-competition-npd-contracting00581nas a2200169   4500008004100000245008300041210006900124260000900193300001000202490000700212653001700219100001600236700001800252700002000270700001500290856010600305       2015                        eng d00aA Theory of the Nexus Supplier: A Critical Supplier from a Network Perspective0 aTheory of the Nexus Supplier A Critical Supplier from a Network   c2015  a52-660 v5110aSupply Chain1 aKim, Yusoon1 aYan, Tingting1 aChoi, Thomas, Y1 aYang, Yang  u/biblio/theory-nexus-supplier-critical-supplier-network-perspective-000415nas a2200133   4500008004100000245003800041210003800079260002100117653001700138100001600155700001800171700001700189856007500206       2013                        eng d00aToward a Theory of Nexus Supplier0 aToward a Theory of Nexus Supplier  aDenver, COc201310aSupply Chain1 aKim, Yusoon1 aYan, Tingting1 aChoi, Thomas  u/biblio/toward-theory-nexus-supplier-0