01719nas a2200145   4500008004100000245007700041210006900118260000900187520119300196653001701389100001701406700002101423700001601444856011301460       2022                        eng d00aRevisiting Meriwether v. Hartop and Academic Freedom in Higher Education0 aRevisiting Meriwether v Hartop and Academic Freedom in Higher Ed  c20223 aAlthough the nature and extent of academic freedom has been subject to analysis for over a century, recent developments underscore the need to reconsider the proper scope of academic freedom. These developments include Meriwether v. Hartop, a 2021 Sixth Circuit decision in which a professor claimed a Constitutional right, based in academic freedom, to refuse to use a student’s pronouns; the growing science of pedagogy and understanding of how students learn; and the changing role of higher education in the United States. We propose updated factors for assessing the scope of academic freedom that balance the interests of the university, individual faculty members, students, and the general public. In doing so, we specifically address and discuss the interest of the state in delivering an “effective education”—a concept that we ground in both the literature of constitutional rights and also the literature of effective pedagogy, linking the interest of the state in delivering effective learning experiences to the science of teaching and learning. We also address the need for the recognition of gender pronouns and the potential for harm when they are not recognized.10aBusiness Law1 aScott, Inara1 aBrown, Elizabeth1 aYordy, Eric  u/biblio/revisiting-meriwether-v-hartop-and-academic-freedom-higher-education01457nas a2200169   4500008004100000245007100041210006900112260000900181300001100190490000700201520089800208653001701106100001701123700002101140700001601161856011001177       2020                        eng d00aR Corps: When Should Corporate Values Receive Religious Protection0 aR Corps When Should Corporate Values Receive Religious Protectio  c2020  a91-1330 v173 aIn this article, we explain how a corporation might invoke religious freedom claims in order to protect corporate values such as diversity, equality, sanctuary, or women’s access to reproductive care which are not exclusively associated with a religion, and are often held by secular entities. In order to do so, we must address the following unresolved legal issues: 1) How can one define whether a set of beliefs are “religious” when those beliefs are held not just by a single individual, but by a diverse collection of individuals? 2) Does the meaning of religion change when it is no longer exercised by a human being but instead by a corporation? 3) Importantly, how would a court evaluate the religious claims of a business entity made up of diverse owners, members, and/or shareholders? And 4) What are the broader consequences, benefits and detriments of protecting such claims?10aBusiness Law1 aScott, Inara1 aBrown, Elizabeth1 aYordy, Eric  u/biblio/r-corps-when-should-corporate-values-receive-religious-protection00533nas a2200145   4500008004100000245008200041210006900123260000900192300001100201490000700212653001700219100001700236700002100253856011300274       2019                        eng d00aBelief v. Belief: Resolving LGBTQ Rights Conflicts in the Religious Workplace0 aBelief v Belief Resolving LGBTQ Rights Conflicts in the Religiou  c2019  a55-1130 v5610aBusiness Law1 aScott, Inara1 aBrown, Elizabeth  u/biblio/belief-v-belief-resolving-lgbtq-rights-conflicts-religious-workplace01208nas a2200157   4500008004100000245007500041210006900116260002700185300001400212490000700226520065600233653001700889100001700906700002100923856010600944       2018                        eng d00aSanctuary Corporations: Time for Liberal Corporations to Get Religion?0 aSanctuary Corporations Time for Liberal Corporations to Get Reli  aPhiladelphia, PAc2018  a1102-11440 v203 aSpurred on by the Trump administration’s aggressive deportation policies, the “sanctuary” movement has seen rapid growth in both religious and secular contexts. Some businesses have publicly expressed their support for undocumented people, but what happens if these businesses run afoul of immigration laws? Following the logic of Hobby Lobby v. Burwell, we argue that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act could provide a shield for businesses, provided they act out of a sincere religious belief. We also discuss the heightened role of religion in today’s legal landscape, and how this may ultimately be a dangerous result for civil society.10aBusiness Law1 aScott, Inara1 aBrown, Elizabeth  u/biblio/sanctuary-corporations-time-liberal-corporations-get-religion01416nas a2200157   4500008004100000245005400041210005400095260000900149300001200158490000700170520098200177653001701159100001701176700002101193856004401214       2017                        eng d00aRedefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy0 aRedefining and Regulating the New Sharing Economy  c2017  a553-7510 v193 aWhile proponents of regulating the sharing economy suggest a need to protect public health, workers, and incumbent businesses, to ensure localities are made whole for the use of public services, opponents of regulation argue that government intervention will stifle innovation and undermine economic and community benefits. The problem with both sides of this argument is that advocates and detractors alike often fail to address the wide differences among the practices and business entities that currently fall under the same umbrella. To address this inappropriate conflation and the resulting confusion among consumers and regulators alike, the goal of this article is to define the sharing economy as it now stands and to create a taxonomy that distinguishes and differentiates the various types of business entities that have been lumped into it. This article then proposes regulatory responses to the differing categories in the taxonomy based on the risks they present.10aBusiness Law1 aScott, Inara1 aBrown, Elizabeth  uhttps://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jbl/