02173nas a2200181   4500008004100000245008300041210006900124260000900193300001200202490000700214520163300221653001701854100002001871700001901891700002201910700002001932856003901952       2020                        eng d00aWhy have Voluntary Time-of-Use Tariffs Fallen Short in the Residential Sector?0 aWhy have Voluntary TimeofUse Tariffs Fallen Short in the Residen  c2020  a617-6420 v293 aWe investigate the causes behind the underwhelming adoption of voluntary Time-of-Use (TOU) tariffs in the residential electricity market. TOU tariffs are deployed by utilities to better match electricity generation capacity with market demand by giving consumers price incentives to reduce their consumption when electricity demand is at its peak. However, consumers in residential electricity markets are heterogeneous in their consumption preferences. Hence, utilities face a trade-off when deploying voluntary TOU tariffs---to provide aggressive price incentives that will only appeal to consumers with flatter profiles or milder incentives to appeal to a larger proportion of the market. Using a game-theoretic model, we identify the key factors that determine the viability of voluntary TOU tariff deployment. On the supply side, the gap between wholesale prices in the peak and off-peak periods determines how much the utility stands to benefit by inducing demand response. On the demand side, heterogeneity within target consumer sets determines how much demand response the utility can induce with a certain price incentive. We show that misaligned incentives between utilities and regulators lead to underwhelming TOU tariff adoption compared to the socially desirable level, and that this under-adoption is worse when consumption preferences are uniformly distributed. We also evaluate the degree of cross-subsidization across tariff structures to identify their implications for equity among the different consumer types, and find that low levels of voluntary TOU adoption are less equitable than the default tariffs.10aSupply Chain1 aMurali, Karthik1 aChoi, Dong, Gu1 aLim, Michael, Kim1 aThomas, Valerie  uhttps://doi.org/10.1111/poms.1312602388nas a2200169   4500008004100000245008800041210006900129260000900198300001200207490000700219520186400226653001702090100002002107700002202127700002602149856004302175       2019                        eng d00aThe Effects of Ecolabels and Environmental Regulations on Green Product Development0 aEffects of Ecolabels and Environmental Regulations on Green Prod  c2019  a519-5350 v213 aProblem definition: We develop a framework for studying the impact of voluntary ecolabels and mandatory environmental regulation on green product development among competing firms. Academic/practical relevance: We contribute to the academic literature on environmental quality competition by explicitly accounting for the credibility of environmental claims made by firms, and by exploring the implications for society of two mechanisms used to remedy credibility-related consumer discounting of firms’ self-declared environmental qualities. We draw parallels between our findings and instances of environmental labeling and regulation from industry to highlight the practical implications of our study. Methodology: We use a game-theoretic framework to analyze a consumer-driven model of green product development. Results: Credibility asymmetry drives product differentiation between two competing firms. The less credible firm always adopts external certification, while the more credible firm does so only if its credibility is sufficiently low. Credibility may also determine whether or not the government should intervene. In the absence of an external certifier, the regulator should intervene by imposing a mandatory environmental standard that is decreasing in stringency as the credibility of the more credible firm increases. In the presence of a certifier, the regulator should intervene if neither firm is sufficiently credible, or if consumers do not value environmental stewardship highly. Managerial implications: We identify how and when government should (and should not) intervene to stimulate green product development when competing firms can use self-labels or external certifications to communicate their environmental performance to consumers. We also determine the optimal strategies for the competing firms and external certifiers.10aSupply Chain1 aMurali, Karthik1 aLim, Michael, Kim1 aPetruzzi, Nicholas, C  uhttps://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2017.070302407nas a2200169   4500008004100000245008800041210006900129260000900198300001200207490000700219520186400226653001702090100002002107700002202127700002602149856006202175       2019                        eng d00aThe Effects of Ecolabels and Environmental Regulations on Green Product Development0 aEffects of Ecolabels and Environmental Regulations on Green Prod  c2019  a519-5350 v213 aProblem definition: We develop a framework for studying the impact of voluntary ecolabels and mandatory environmental regulation on green product development among competing firms. Academic/practical relevance: We contribute to the academic literature on environmental quality competition by explicitly accounting for the credibility of environmental claims made by firms, and by exploring the implications for society of two mechanisms used to remedy credibility-related consumer discounting of firms’ self-declared environmental qualities. We draw parallels between our findings and instances of environmental labeling and regulation from industry to highlight the practical implications of our study. Methodology: We use a game-theoretic framework to analyze a consumer-driven model of green product development. Results: Credibility asymmetry drives product differentiation between two competing firms. The less credible firm always adopts external certification, while the more credible firm does so only if its credibility is sufficiently low. Credibility may also determine whether or not the government should intervene. In the absence of an external certifier, the regulator should intervene by imposing a mandatory environmental standard that is decreasing in stringency as the credibility of the more credible firm increases. In the presence of a certifier, the regulator should intervene if neither firm is sufficiently credible, or if consumers do not value environmental stewardship highly. Managerial implications: We identify how and when government should (and should not) intervene to stimulate green product development when competing firms can use self-labels or external certifications to communicate their environmental performance to consumers. We also determine the optimal strategies for the competing firms and external certifiers.10aSupply Chain1 aMurali, Karthik1 aLim, Michael, Kim1 aPetruzzi, Nicholas, C  uhttps://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/10.1287/msom.2017.070302203nas a2200157   4500008004100000245008300041210006900124260000900193520163300202653001701835100002001852700001901872700002201891700002001913856011201933       2019                        eng d00aWhy have Voluntary Time-of-Use Tariffs Fallen Short in the Residential Sector?0 aWhy have Voluntary TimeofUse Tariffs Fallen Short in the Residen  c20193 aWe investigate the causes behind the underwhelming adoption of voluntary Time-of-Use (TOU) tariffs in the residential electricity market. TOU tariffs are deployed by utilities to better match electricity generation capacity with market demand by giving consumers price incentives to reduce their consumption when electricity demand is at its peak. However, consumers in residential electricity markets are heterogeneous in their consumption preferences. Hence, utilities face a trade-off when deploying voluntary TOU tariffs---to provide aggressive price incentives that will only appeal to consumers with flatter profiles or milder incentives to appeal to a larger proportion of the market. Using a game-theoretic model, we identify the key factors that determine the viability of voluntary TOU tariff deployment. On the supply side, the gap between wholesale prices in the peak and off-peak periods determines how much the utility stands to benefit by inducing demand response. On the demand side, heterogeneity within target consumer sets determines how much demand response the utility can induce with a certain price incentive. We show that misaligned incentives between utilities and regulators lead to underwhelming TOU tariff adoption compared to the socially desirable level, and that this under-adoption is worse when consumption preferences are uniformly distributed. We also evaluate the degree of cross-subsidization across tariff structures to identify their implications for equity among the different consumer types, and find that low levels of voluntary TOU adoption are less equitable than the default tariffs.10aSupply Chain1 aMurali, Karthik1 aChoi, Dong, Gu1 aLim, Michael, Kim1 aThomas, Valerie  u/biblio/why-have-voluntary-time-use-tariffs-fallen-short-residential-sector01944nas a2200169   4500008004100000245010100041210006900142260000900211300001400220490000700234520140900241653001701650100002001667700002201687700002601709856003901735       2015                        eng d00aMunicipal Groundwater Management: Optimal Allocation and Control of a Renewable Natural Resource0 aMunicipal Groundwater Management Optimal Allocation and Control   c2015  a1453-14720 v243 aWe study a municipal groundwater management problem to determine optimal allocation and control policies in the presence of water transfer opportunities. We establish and characterize threshold polices governing export or import decisions of a given municipality. In the spirit of the Triple Bottom Line (3BL), we ascertain that exporting (importing) water through a water market defined by an exogenous export/import price is detrimental (beneficial) to both society and the environment within the municipality. In contrast, fixed quantity trading between two municipalities defined by an endogenously negotiated export/import price can have positive as well as negative impacts from a global 3BL perspective. In particular, typical trading scenarios that occur between municipalities can be detrimental to the environment. We also study the implications of privatization, and find that a privatized municipality would be more (less) likely to export (import) water as compared to its non‐privatized counterpart, resulting in negative implications for society within the municipality. However, if exports are banned, privatization can benefit the environment by mitigating the damage caused by the extraction differential, a phenomenon analogous to the green paradox. Moreover, careful and restricted privatization of municipalities can lead to positive global 3BL impacts from fixed quantity trading.10aSupply Chain1 aMurali, Karthik1 aLim, Michael, Kim1 aPetruzzi, Nicholas, C  uhttps://doi.org/10.1111/poms.1238901968nas a2200169   4500008004100000245010100041210006900142260000900211300001400220490000700234520140900241653001701650100002001667700002201687700002601709856006301735       2015                        eng d00aMunicipal Groundwater Management: Optimal Allocation and Control of a Renewable Natural Resource0 aMunicipal Groundwater Management Optimal Allocation and Control   c2015  a1453-14720 v243 aWe study a municipal groundwater management problem to determine optimal allocation and control policies in the presence of water transfer opportunities. We establish and characterize threshold polices governing export or import decisions of a given municipality. In the spirit of the Triple Bottom Line (3BL), we ascertain that exporting (importing) water through a water market defined by an exogenous export/import price is detrimental (beneficial) to both society and the environment within the municipality. In contrast, fixed quantity trading between two municipalities defined by an endogenously negotiated export/import price can have positive as well as negative impacts from a global 3BL perspective. In particular, typical trading scenarios that occur between municipalities can be detrimental to the environment. We also study the implications of privatization, and find that a privatized municipality would be more (less) likely to export (import) water as compared to its non‐privatized counterpart, resulting in negative implications for society within the municipality. However, if exports are banned, privatization can benefit the environment by mitigating the damage caused by the extraction differential, a phenomenon analogous to the green paradox. Moreover, careful and restricted privatization of municipalities can lead to positive global 3BL impacts from fixed quantity trading.10aSupply Chain1 aMurali, Karthik1 aLim, Michael, Kim1 aPetruzzi, Nicholas, C  uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/poms.12389