TY  - JOUR
T1  - Executive Compensation and Agency Costs in Germany
JF  - Journal of Banking & Finance
Y1  - 2003
A1  - Elston,Julie
A1  - Goldberg,Larry
KW  - Finance
KW  - OSU-Cascades
AB  - With the growth of international mergers like DaimlerChrysler, interest in executive compensation practices abroad, particularly in Germany, has increased. Using unique data sources for Germany, we find that similar to US firms, German firms also have agency problems caused by the separation of ownership from control, with ownership dispersion leading to higher compensation. In addition, there is evidence that bank influence has a negative impact on compensation.
VL  - 27
CP  - 7
U2  - a
U4  - 650104832
ID  - 650104832
ER  -