TY  - JOUR
T1  - Analyst Information Acquisition via EDGAR
JF  - Management Science
Y1  - 2020
A1  - Gibbons,Brian
A1  - Iliev,Peter
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
AB  - We identify analysts’ information acquisition patterns by linking EDGAR (Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval) server activity to analysts’ brokerage houses. Analysts rely on EDGAR in 24% of their estimate updates with an average of eight filings viewed. We document that analysts’ attention to public information is driven by the demand for information and the analysts’ incentives and career concerns. We find that information acquisition via EDGAR is associated with a significant reduction in analysts’ forecasting error relative to their peers. This relationship is likewise present when we focus on the intensity of analyst research. Attention to public information further enables analysts to provide forecasts for more time periods and more financial metrics. Informed recommendation updates are associated with substantial and persistent abnormal returns, even when the analyst accesses historical filings. Analysts’ use of EDGAR is associated with longer and more informative analysis within recommendation reports.
CY  - INFORMS
U2  - a
U4  - 161327624192
ID  - 161327624192
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Experimental Shareholder Activism: A Novel Approach to Organizational Research
JF  - Journal of Vocational Behavior
Y1  - 2020
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
A1  - Leavitt,Keith
KW  - Finance
KW  - Management
AB  - Decision making processes and consequent policy decisions of top management teams often have tremendous impact on employee careers and wellbeing, but the difficulty of accessing executive decision making has made studying such processes especially difficult. Whereas scholars have often relied on their own professional networks to gather small samples of executives or leveraged proxy measures compiled from publicly-available documents, we propose and demonstrate an alternative approach which we term Experimental Shareholder Activism (ESA). ESA allows researchers to directly study executive leadership via the shareholder proposal process—under Rule 14a-8—by purchasing relatively small amounts of stock in a company, and experimentally manipulating features of shareholder proposals to elicit responses from key stakeholders within the company. This approach allows for the direct examination of executive decision making with the benefit of quasi-experimental design. We describe the method, identify vocational and career-relevant areas of inquiry best suited to ESA, and discuss manipulations readily embedded in shareholder proposals. We then provide a toolkit for scholars interested in studying executive decision making on employee career and Human Resource-related outcomes, and demonstrate the viability of such an approach via a pilot experiment.
VL  - 120
U2  - a
U4  - 183677749248
ID  - 183677749248
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Governance Changes through Shareholder Initiatives: The Case of Proxy Access
JF  - Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Y1  - 2020
A1  - Bhandari,Tara
A1  - Iliev,Peter
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
AB  - We study a regulatory change that led to over 300 shareholder proposals to instate proxy access and more than 250 firms adopting proxy access from 2012 to 2016. The firms expected to benefit most from proxy access have the most positive market reaction to receiving a proposal, but adoptions are not concentrated at these firms. We find that proposing and voting shareholders do not discriminate between firms that would or would not benefit, and that management resists proxy access at the firms that stand to benefit most. This process results in the concentration of adoptions at large, already well-governed firms.
U2  - a
U4  - 127028414464
ID  - 127028414464
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Many analysts, one dataset: Making transparent how variations in analytical choices affect results
JF  - Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science
Y1  - 2018
A1  - Silberzahn,R
A1  - Uhlmann,E
A1  - Martin,D
A1  - Anselmi,P
A1  - Aust,F
A1  - Awtrey,E
A1  - Bahník,S
A1  - Bai,F
A1  - Bannard,C
A1  - Bonnier,E
A1  - Carlsson,R
A1  - Cheung,F
A1  - Christensen,G
A1  - Clay,R
A1  - Craig,M
A1  - Rosa,A
A1  - Dam,L
A1  - Evans,M
A1  - Cervantes,I
A1  - Fong,N
A1  - Gamez-Djokic,M
A1  - Glenz,A
A1  - Gordon-McKeon,S
A1  - Heaton,T
A1  - Eriksson,K
A1  - Heene,M
A1  - Mohr,A
A1  - Högden,F
A1  - Hui,K
A1  - Johannesson,M
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
A1  - Kaszubowski,E
A1  - Kennedy,D
A1  - Lei,R
A1  - Lindsay,T
A1  - Liverani,S
A1  - Madan,C
A1  - Molden,D
A1  - Molleman,E
A1  - Morey,R
A1  - Mulder,L
A1  - Nijstad,B
A1  - Pope,B
A1  - Pope,N
A1  - Prenoveau,J
A1  - Rink,F
A1  - Robusto,E
A1  - Roderique,H
A1  - Sandberg,A
A1  - Schlueter,E
A1  - Schönbrodt,F
A1  - Sherman,M
A1  - Sommer,S
A1  - Sotak,K
A1  - Spain,S
A1  - Spörlein,C
A1  - Stafford,T
A1  - Stefanutti,L
A1  - Täuber,S
A1  - Ullrich,J
A1  - Vianello,M
A1  - Wagenmakers,E
A1  - Witkowiak,M
A1  - Yoon,S
A1  - Nosek,B
KW  - Finance
U2  - a
U4  - 162090280960
ID  - 162090280960
ER  - 

TY  - ABST
T1  - Disruption in Health Care Markets
Y1  - 2017
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
UR  - https://businessradio.wharton.upenn.edu/programs/the-business-of-health-care
U2  - d
U4  - 154845061120
ID  - 154845061120
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Internal Governance and Performance: Evidence From When External Discipline is Weak
JF  - Journal of Corporate Finance
Y1  - 2017
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
AB  - The effect of internal governance on performance is potentially economically significant but may be difficult to identify because of confounding external disciplinary mechanisms and the endogenous choice of internal governance. This study addresses those difficulties by using nonprofit hospitals as an economic environment with muted external disciplinary mechanisms and instrumenting for internal governance using governance spillovers of geographically local public firms. Using patient heart attack survival as a measure of performance, a one standard deviation increase in strength of internal governance reduces the probability of death by 0.89 percentage points after controlling for patient characteristics.
VL  - 43
UR  - http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0929119917300196
U2  - a
U4  - 127028529152
ID  - 127028529152
ER  - 

TY  - ABST
T1  - Progress in Understanding Proxy Access and the Shareholder Proposal Process
Y1  - 2017
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
A1  - Bhandari,Tara
A1  - Iliev,Peter
KW  - Finance
UR  - https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/01/03/progress-in-understanding-proxy-access-and-the-shareholder-proposal-process/
U2  - d
U4  - 138714636288
ID  - 138714636288
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions: Are Appraisal Rights Being Abused?
JF  - Finance Research Letters
Y1  - 2017
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
A1  - Lundberg,Clark
KW  - Finance
AB  - Appraisal rights grant dissenting shareholders in an acquisition the right to petition the court to determine the value of their shares. These rights can protect shareholders from acquisitions below fundamental value or can be abused by opportunistic investors. We examine the use of appraisal rights and find the evidence is most consistent with appraisal rights functioning as recourse when the target firm is sold below fundamental value.
U2  - a
U4  - 138602024960
ID  - 138602024960
ER  - 

TY  - ABST
T1  - A Gadfly's Perspective
Y1  - 2016
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
UR  - https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/21/a-gadflys-perspective/
U2  - d
U4  - 133679271936
ID  - 133679271936
ER  - 

TY  - ABST
T1  - Proposals Meant to Spark Nuanced Conversation about Stock Buybacks
Y1  - 2016
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
U2  - d
U4  - 129112414208
ID  - 129112414208
ER  - 

TY  - HEAR
T1  - Public versus Private Provision of Governance: The Case of Proxy Access
Y1  - 2016
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
JA  - SFS Cavalcade
CY  - Toronto, Ontario
U2  - c
U4  - 128932503552
ID  - 128932503552
ER  - 

TY  - HEAR
T1  - Internal Governance and Performance: Evidence From When External Discipline is Weak
Y1  - 2015
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
JA  - Seminar Series
CY  - San Diego State University
U2  - c
U4  - 115023069184
ID  - 115023069184
ER  - 

TY  - ABST
T1  - Public versus Private Provision of Governance: The Case of Proxy Access
Y1  - 2015
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
A1  - Iliev,Peter
A1  - Bhandari,Tara
KW  - Finance
UR  - http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2015/10/01/public-versus-private-provision-of-governance-the-case-of-proxy-access/
U2  - d
U4  - 115408058368
ID  - 115408058368
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - Daily Data is Bad for Beta: Opacity and Frequency-Dependent Betas
JF  - Review of Asset Pricing Studies
Y1  - 2014
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
A1  - Gilbert,T.
A1  - Hrdlicka,C.
A1  - Siegel,S.
KW  - Finance
U2  - a
U4  - 109257807872
ID  - 109257807872
ER  - 

TY  - HEAR
T1  - How Important is Governance? Evidence from Heart Attack Survival
Y1  - 2014
A1  - Kalodimos,Jonathan
KW  - Finance
JA  - Southwestern Finance Association Annual Conference
CY  - Dallas, TX
U2  - c
U4  - 115023095808
ID  - 115023095808
ER  -