TY  - JOUR
T1  - Counteracting Globalization's Skeptics: How Diasporas Influence the Internationalization Preferences of Minority Entrepreneurs' Firms
JF  - Global Strategy Journal
Y1  - 2019
A1  - Inouye,Todd M
A1  - Joshi,Amol
A1  - Hemmatian,Iman
A1  - Robinson,Jeffrey A
KW  - Strategy & Entrepreneurship
U2  - a
U4  - 162582022144
ID  - 162582022144
ER  - 

TY  - JOUR
T1  - How do legal surprises drive organizational attention and case resolution? An analysis of false patent marking lawsuits
JF  - Research Policy
Y1  - 2018
A1  - Joshi,Amol
A1  - Hemmatian,Iman
KW  - Strategy & Entrepreneurship
AB  - Legal surprises are unexpected suits or actions in which plaintiffs rely on claims or precedents that may be obscure, unfamiliar, or unknown to the defendants. Our study explores false patent marking suits, a unique type of patent-related legal surprise involving allegations of defendants marking products with ineligible patent numbers to deceive customers and/or deter competitors. An abrupt shift in U.S. Federal Courts’ interpretation of intellectual property rights (IPRs) policy amplified plaintiff incentives for filing these suits while escalating defendant penalties for proven violations. Handling costly legal surprises such as false patent marking suits requires focused attention from managers. Our core premise is that temporal and evidential cues in the timelines and storylines of plaintiffs’ legal narratives in surprise suits attract defendants’ organizational attention. We hypothesize about temporal focus (past, present, and future) and evidentiary reasoning (relevance, credibility, and inferential power) as attention cues and possible predictors of the mode (litigation or negotiation) and timing of case resolution. We apply automated content analysis to official court records for 992 false patent marking cases (2009-2011) and quantify competing risks using hazard models. We find that differences in temporal focus and evidentiary reasoning in the legal narratives of surprise suits are significant predictors of case resolution mode and timing. We also find that defendants countersuing to redirect plaintiffs’ attention is an effective negotiating tactic. We discuss the economic significance and strategic implications of our empirical findings on legal surprises, attention, case resolution mode and timing, and the unintended consequences of IPR policy changes.
VL  - 47
U2  - a
U4  - 99790108672
ID  - 99790108672
ER  - 

TY  - HEAR
T1  - The Impact of Bankruptcy on Competitors: How Technology Overlap and Diversification Affect Value Redistribution.
Y1  - 2017
A1  - Arthurs,Jonathan
A1  - Cho,Sam Yul
A1  - Choi,Yohan
A1  - Hemmatian,Iman
A1  - Joshi,Amol
KW  - Strategy & Entrepreneurship
JA  - AOM 2017 Annual Meeting
CY  - Atlanta, GA
U2  - c
U4  - 162430285824
ID  - 162430285824
ER  - 

TY  - CONF
T1  - Impact of Bankruptcy on Rivals: How Tech Overlap and Diversification Affects Value Redistribution
T2  - Academy of Management Proceedings
Y1  - 2017
A1  - Arthurs,Jonathan
A1  - Cho,Sam Yul
A1  - Choi,Yohan
A1  - Hemmatian,Iman
A1  - Joshi,Amol
KW  - Strategy & Entrepreneurship
AB  - Prior research on bankruptcy proposes two potential outcomes for a bankrupt firm’s industry rivals: a contagion effect wherein rivals’ stock prices decline, and a competitive effect wherein rivals benefit from a competitor’s decline. Although empirical evidence substantiates the contagion effect, existing studies do not consistently account for the competitive effect. We develop and test theory explaining how the degree of technology overlap and diversification strategy of competitors influences the severity of the contagion effect and the expected occurrence of the competitive effect among rivals. We find that greater technology overlap among a bankrupt firm and its competitors exacerbates the contagion effect. Furthermore, competitors with higher unrelated diversification are more susceptible to contagion, while competitors with higher related diversification benefit more from a rival’s bankruptcy.
JA  - Academy of Management Proceedings
U2  - b
U4  - 188439541760
ID  - 188439541760
ER  -